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Abstract: The Grameen Bank in Bangladesh is known worldwide for
its success in providing credit to the poor. However, subsequent replications of its methodology in other parts of the world have been less
successful. Is there really an infallible solution that works everywhere,
and is outreach to the poor compatible with sustainability? A
Grameen replicator in the Philippines, the Center for Agriculture and
Rural Development (CARD), has recently set itself firmly on the path
to sustainability by becoming a formal sector, rural bank—the first
credit NGO in the country to do so. During the period, from 1993 to
June 1999, CARD’s all-female outreach soared from 1,711 to 26,369. Its
operational self-sufficiency ratio increased from 0.46 to 1.09. At the
end of June 1999, CARD’s loan portfolio stood at US$2.7 million, its
repayment rate was 99.9%, and its financial self-sufficiency ratio was
0.85. The principal lesson to be learned from the CARD’s success is
that Grameen-type microfinance institutions (MFIs) can be sustainable
and can substantially increase their outreach. CARD’s social capital
comprises (a) a core of good Grameen practices, such as high moral
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commitment on the part of the leaders, based on values instilled
through training; peer control, to preclude adverse selection and moral
hazard; and a strict credit discipline; (b) innovative adaptations to suit
the Philippine context, such as the adoption of rural bank status under
central bank supervision; vigorous mobilization of voluntary savings;
the provision of differentiated, profit-making loan and insurance products; and a broadening of the clientele to include poor and nonpoor
depositors, while adhering to its mission of lending to poor women
only.

Grameen Replicators in the Philippines
The Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, formally established in 1979, is
widely considered one of the world’s most successful financial institutions banking with the poor. In an effort to alleviate poverty,
donors have supported replication programs in numerous countries,
including the United States. The International Fund for
Agricultural Development (IFAD) of the United Nations was the
first major supporter of the Grameen Bank and has subsequently
assisted capacity-building in many replication programs. Assuming
that the only institutions capable in the long-run of reaching large
numbers of poor people are those that mobilize their own resources
and cover the costs from their income, donors are becoming increasingly concerned about the viability and sustainability of the
Grameen replicators. 1
The Philippines was one of the first countries to replicate Grameen
banking on a large scale. When the government program’s executing
agency—the Agricultural Credit Policy Council (ACPC)—examined
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its experience with 27 replicators, 23 of which were still in existence
in June 1993, there were mixed conclusions. The repayment performance was impressive, averaging a rate of 96.8%, but the overall picture was dismal. The replication program was found to be
donor-driven. Internal resource mobilization appeared to be minimal. Interest rates were inadequate and administrative costs exorbitant, amounting to 47% of every peso lent and 170% of every peso
saved.’ The operational self-sufficiency ratio averaged 0.24. Noting
that “excessive brokering of low-cost funds may discourage savings
mobilization,” ACPC (1995) warned that “any attempt . . . to replicate or expand . . . should be carried out with great caution.” The
replicators were not sustainable, nor did they reach a significant
number of poor people, in a country with over 800 rural banks and
3,000 credit cooperatives (Seibel 1998).
In 1996, the Asian and Pacific Development Centre (APDC)—an
intergovernmental body of Asian-Pacific countries, based in Kuala
Lumpur—carried out an assessment of microfinance institutions
(MFIs) in 11 of these countries, with the support of UNDP. Included
in the study were seven MFIs from the Philippines, six of which
used the Grameen technique. By the end of 1995, the situation of
the sample replicators had improved generally, but the gap between
good and poor performers had widened. Transaction costs per peso
lent ranged from 0.19% to 1.30%, the operational self-sufficiency
ratio from 0.08% to 1.34%, and the full financial self-sufficiency
ratio (adjusted for subsidies received and for inflation) from 0.07%
to 1.18% (Getubig, Remenyi, & Quiñones, 1997; Seibel et al., 1998).
The only fully viable and sustainable institution among the seven
was a rural cooperative bank. The two best performers among the
credit NGOs quickly learned their lesson and decided to vie for sustainability and outreach. In order to mobilize savings legally, they
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applied for rural banking licenses, which would also bring them
under the supervision of the central bank and its prudent standards.
When the central bank raised the level of minimum capital requirements, one of the two applicants was forced to withdraw. The
remaining applicant, the Centre for Agriculture and Rural
Development (CARD), then received the required license to establish the rural bank. How did this event impact CARD’s outreach and
viability, and what were the innovations introduced by CARD in
order to meet the required standards of a rural bank? Behind these
questions lies a broader question: Is sustainability compatible with
outreach to the poor?

CARD: Unsustainable Beginnings as a Credit NGO
CARD was established in 1986 as one of many new NGOs inspired
by the onset of a new era in the Philippines after the downfall of the
Marcos regime. In January 1988, with the support of two small
grants, CARD began organizing the poor into mixed groups of 15 to
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45 members, then registered them as associations and channeled
standardized short-term microloans to each member, offering negotiable repayment schedules. This turned out to be a false start. After
eight months of operation, the only groups that had repaid their
loans were the two that had opted for monthly installments. The
remaining five, committed to lump sum repayment upon maturity,
defaulted. The overall repayment rate during the year was 68%.
Under pressure from international donors, CARD had to either
revamp its operations or close.
In late 1988, the president of CARD visited the Grameen Bank in
Bangladesh. Deeply impressed by the ability of the poor to engage
in income-generating activities and repay their loans on time, he
decided to adopt the Grameen approach for CARD and reorganized
the members of the various associations into groups of 5 and centers
of 30 members each. However, this change met with considerable
opposition. The complex Grameen discipline—which included
weekly meetings and the payment of weekly installments—was
greatly disliked, particularly by the men, and four of the associations left the project. However, 89 poor women agreed to participate in a pilot venture from January to December 1989. The results
were very positive. The credit discipline, which is one of the most
outstanding achievements of the Grameen approach, has produced
repayment rates of between 98% and 100% since 1994. This impressed the central bank so much that it consented to fully noncollateralized lending when CARD established itself as a rural bank
Because the rigid criteria enabled only the poor to gain access,
growth in active membership was slow initially, increasing from 89
members in 1989 to 1,711 in 1993. The years 1990-96 represented a
period of experimentation to modify the Grameen technology.
CARD developed its own training system and operations manual.
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Basically, it substituted six-month first-loans with one-year loans,
requested a minimum self-financing ratio of 25% from repeat borrowers, introduced a mutual life and accident insurance fund,
replaced group funds by center funds, offered multipurpose loans
for prime borrowers, added voluntary withdrawable savings (ignoring the law which prevents NGOs from collecting deposits), and
finally, provided a staff-incentive scheme. Active membership grew
from 1,711 in 1993 to 6,844 in 1996. By 1996, nonwithdrawable
compulsory savings stood at PHP12m, and voluntary savings at
PHP1m. The ratio of operational self-sufficiency, or viability, which
had declined from 0.31 in 1991 to 0.25 in 1992, increased to 0.46 in
1993 and rose to 0.77 in 1996.

Transformation into a Rural Bank
In May 1996, CARD submitted its application to establish a rural
bank,

and received approval in December of that year.

Consequently, CARD Rural Bank now falls under the regulations
and supervision of the central bank, which mobilizes an entirely
new quality of social capital.
CARD Rural Bank deposited PHP5m as paid-up capital with
Landbank, and formally opened on September 1, 1997. There are
now two separate institutions: CARD Rural Bank (five branches) for
full-fledged financial intermediation, and CARD NGO for group formation and guidance, including financial intermediation in areas
not covered by CARD Rural Bank. CARD NGO has 16 branches,
covering the island provinces of Masbate, Marinduque, and
Mindoro. An application for branching out has been submitted to
the central bank in order to bring all financial activities under the
umbrella of CARD Rural Bank (RB). Due to legal restrictions, CARD
NGO owns only 25% of CARD RB; the rest is owned by five board
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members and staff, who have entered into a trust agreement with
the NGO.
CARD’s transformation into a bank appears to have greatly facilitated its growth in outreach, which soared to 10,868 in 1997 and to
26,369 in June 1999. CARD RB has ambitious goals: 50,000 active
members by 2000 and 150,000 by 2002.
CARD Rural Bank offers passbook savings at 5% and fixed
deposits that range from a minimum of PHP10,000 for one month at
7% interest, to PHP500,000 for 12 months at 15%—all of which is
above the usual rates of commercial banks. As of July 1998, the savings deposit balance was PHP14m. There are five loan products, all
with weekly installments: regular loans, increasing from a first loan
of PHP2,000 to a fourth loan of PHP10,000; asset acquisition loans
up to PHP50,000; housing loans up to PHP20,000; short-term, multipurpose loans up to PHP5,000; and prime-borrower loans up to
PHP100,000. Maturity ranges from 12 to 75 weeks, but most are 50
weeks. Interest rates are a flat 20% plus an upfront service fee of
4%. Effective annual interest rates are approximately 45.6% to
53.8%.
In July 1998, CARD Rural Bank’s loan portfolio amounted to
PHP32m, and that of CARD NGO to PHP38m. By December 1998,
the portfolios had increased to PHP39m (6,530 borrowers) and
PHP44.3m (14,087 borrowers), respectively, a combined total of
PHP83.3m (20,617 borrow-ers). In June 1999, the total portfolio of
loans outstanding amounted to PHP2.7m. Deposits in December
1998 amounted to PHP14.8m (38.0% of loans outstanding) in CARD
Rural Bank and PHP10.9m (24.7% of loans outstanding) in CARD
NGO, totaling PHP25.8m (30.9% loans out-standing). Equity and
deposits together accounted for 37.0% of loans outstanding. In 1998,
both entities obtained a loan of PHP15m from the People’s Credit
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and Finance Corporation (PCFC), which is funded by the Asian
Development Bank (AsDB) and IFAD, with a 12% interest per
annum and a 1% annual service fee on the outstanding balance.
Other donors include CGAP and Grameen Trust.
CARD’s transformation into a rural bank, which included a
preparatory phase in 1996-97, provided the legal foundation for vigorous voluntary savings mobilization and put it quickly on the road
toward its desired goal of self-reliance and sustainability. The cost
efficiency ratio (cost per peso lent) improved from 0.69 in 1995 to
0.33 in 1997. The operational self-sufficiency ratio went from 0.46
in 1995 to 0.77 in 1996, 1.22 in 1997, 1.00 in 1998 (a decline due to
the addition of new branches), and 1.09 in June 1999. The financial
self-sufficiency ratio (adjusted for subsidies and inflation) grew from
0.38 in 1995 to 0.52 in 1996, 0.70 in 1997, and 0.85 in June 1999.
CARD’s branch viability (operational self-sufficiency ratio of at least
1.0) increased rapidly, from 1 out of 8 branches in 1995 to 4 out of
10 in 1996 and 8 out of 13 in 1997.
CARD Rural Bank has proven that outreach to the poor and viability are not only compatible but are mutually reinforcing. This is
also confirmed by Rojahn & Osner (1998), who observed that when
Grameen replicators are low in operational viability, they are also
low in outreach, while replicators high in viability are also high in
outreach. With regard to financial self-reliance and full financial
self-sufficiency, the Bank has made great progress in recent years.
However, continuous access to “easy” donor money might hamper
its vigorous efforts toward self-reliance and sustainability. This
issue may require some careful monitoring over the next few years.
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The Social Capital of a Successful Grameen
Replicator
Is the Grameen approach a type of social capital that can be
exported worldwide and meet with a success similar to that of the
Grameen Bank in Bangladesh? Does the Grameen approach provide
an optimal solution to the problem of how to provide financial services to the poor? Social capital is defined here, in the context of
microfinance, as the shared normative system of a group or an organization that shapes people’s capacity to work together and produce results according to the group’s—or organization’s—purpose.
The specific norms of a group or an organization are, in turn,
rooted in the more general norms and values of a society or a subsector. CARD Rural Bank, now part of the financial sector, falls
under the regulations and supervision of the central bank as the
norm enforcement agency. The consequent performance standards
imposed on it will support its drive toward sustainability and
economies of scale and scope, or wider outreach and product diversity. Such standards are missing among unregulated credit NGOs
and are not always enforced by soft-hearted donors. This social capital perspective is being pursued further in a separate study
(Quiñones, Seibel, & Llanto, 1999).
The outreach of some 30 Grameen replicators in the Philippines
(Seibel, 1998) has been negligible compared to the totality of financial services provided by other microfinance institutions. The replications were found to be donor-driven, and donor dependency has
undermined their viability. Only a few of the institutions were
found to be operationally self-sufficient, covering the costs directly
from their incomes. In some cases, even effective annual interest
rates of around 50% (or real rates, adjusted for inflation, of around
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40%) were not sufficient to cover the costs of the Grameen technology. However, all the institutions examined-the only ones that
have survived-have made some progress in this respect.
Nonetheless, sustainability, as measured by the financial self-sufficiency ratio, is in sight for only one of the replicating institutions
to date: CARD Rural Bank. The other replicators we looked at did
not even remotely approach an adequate level of internal resource
mobilization; nor had they earned sufficient revenue to cover the
costs of all their operating, financial, and loan loss expenses, and the
value of adjustments for subsidies and inflation. Paradoxically, the
biggest obstacle in the development of the Grameen replicators has
been donor support, a powerful incentive to substitute external
resources for local savings. 5 Only savings and other domestic
resources have a chance to grow dynamically: dole-outs do not. It
seems speculative at this point to predict whether or not financial
self-sufficiency might be reached by the other Grameen replicators.
Those who adhere to the pure and unadjusted Grameen technology
are, in the long-run, unlikely to withstand the growing competition
from other MFIs.
Do the Grameen replicators reach the poor, and are they sustainable? According to the limited evidence available to date, the answer
is that with the exception of one case, all the replicators are unsustainable and consequently are unable to reach a significant number
of poor people. It appears that the Grameen approach has no magic
formula and no best practice or unique and optimal solution that
may be applied around the world in order to alleviate poverty.
Perhaps no such optimal solution or best practice ever existed, or
may ever be found. However, some good practices may work for a
limited time under certain conditions and may compete with other
good practices.
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Several good practices contribute to the success of the one successful replicator: some are closely related to the basic Grameen
approach, and some are innovative. It appears that three good practices in particular constitute the hard core social capital of the original Grameen approach:
•

high moral commitment of leaders, based on values enforced
through training

•

peer selection and peer enforcement, precluding adverse selection and moral hazard

•

credit discipline, including weekly installments, rigid insistence on timely repayment, and repeat loans of increasing
amounts, contingent on repayment performance.
It further appears that some innovative features, which are modi-

fications of the classical replication model, constitute additional
core social capital dimensions:
•

local rural bank status

•

deposit mobilization from the poor and nonpoor through differentiated products with attractive interest rates

•

demand-driven, differentiated loan and insurance products
which cover all costs and risks

•

client differentiation through different-size loan and deposit
products.
We may hypothesize that Grameen-type MFIs in the Philippines

are likely to be successful only to the extent that they implement
criteria like those above—and unsuccessful to the extent they fail to
do so. We tentatively consider the good practices listed above as
being the essence of the social capital of Grameen-type institutions,
at least in the Philippines. Whether or not this is the case worldwide
remains to be seen. Depending on the policy environment, legal
framework, microfinance infrastructure, and particular circumVolume 1 Number 1
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stances, most of these practices may be recommended for emulation, both by Grameen and non-Grameen MFIs, albeit not mechanically.

Conclusion
The principal lesson is that if a Grameen-type MFI registers as a
bank, mobilizes its own re-sources through differentiated savings
products, offers differentiated loan and insurance products which
cover all costs and risks, and provides larger-size loan and deposit
products to its poor and near-poor members, it has a good chance of
becoming viable and financially self-sufficient. At the same time, it
can continue to adhere to its mission and substantially increase its
outreach to poor women. However, whether or not an MFI will do
all of this depends on its management and board. According to
CARD’s experience, funding from donors can contribute to outreach and sustainability, but only if these donors refrain from interference and respect the institution’s autonomy. To date, no
regulatory authority supervises and enforces these good Grameen
banking requirements in the Philippines. The lack of a definition of
prudential norms and good practices for Grameen replicators in the
Philippines, and of an effective delegated system of supervision
under the ultimate authority of the central bank, is perhaps the
greatest weakness of the Grameen replication program. The establishment of such a regulatory system might be a new field for donor
support.

Notes
1

Viability is measured by the operational self-sufficiency ratio: Financial
Income (Financial Costs + Operating Costs + Loan Loss Provision).
Sustainability has two aspects: (a) measured by the financial self-sufficiency ratio, it refers to the extent to which an institution not only covers
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its operational costs but also preserves the value of its resources by
accounting for subsidies and the effects of inflation: Financial Income
(Financial Costs + Operating Costs + Loan Loss Provision + Imputed
Cost of Capital); (b) measured by the internal resources ratio, it refers to
the extent to which an MFI mobilizes its own financial resources internally
instead of depending on government, donor, or commercial funding:
(Equity + Retained Earnings + Deposits)/Average Performing Assets. In
donor-driven MFIs, the donations and grants ratio is more popular:
(Donation + Grants)/Average Performing Assets (SEEP 1995).
Conversion of pesos into US dollar has been somewhat problematic since
1997. From 1991 to mid-1997, exchange rates were fairly steady, fluctuating between PHP25.7 and PHP27.5. Affected by the Asian financial crisis,
the peso depreciated from a monthly average of PHP27.6 in July 1997 to
PHP37.5 in December 1997, with an annual average of PHP28.6. During
1998, monthly averages fluctuated between PHP38.4 and a peak PHP43.6
in September, ending with PHP39.0 in December, and an annual average of
PHP40.7.
CARD received support from IFAD through a training grant to CASHPOR
in 1998 to establish a Grameen Bank Replica-tion Training Methodology
within the Philippines. Recently CARD has gained access to PCFC, a
national apex organization for the refinancing of MFIs, which is funded by
AsDB and IFAD. Other donors include CGAP and Grameen Bank.
CARD (1998) is prepared to share its experience (card@msc.net.ph). Since
1996, it has trained 2,500 people in courses of one to two weeks’ length.
Training is conducted in English, at PHP500 (US$11.50) per day.
This conclusion is shared by the authors of a GTZ study of the financial
sector in the Philippines, who “do not recommend promoting Grameen
Bank replicators at the institutional level because the model is not currently implemented in a sustainable manner in the Philippines.” This is
seen in the context of “the need to revise the system of incentives created
by national and international donors. These have accorded precedence to
disbursing short-term credit to target groups over the institutional and
financial sustainability of the programs and institutions” (Bieding et al.
1998:79).

References
Agricultural Credit Policy Council. (1995). An evaluation of the Grameen Bank
replication project in the Philippines. Manila: ACPC
Bieding, G., Hartig, P., & Sprodofski, G. (1998). Country study: The financial sec-

Volume 1 Number 1

129

Journal of Microfinance
tor in the Philippines. Eschborn: GTZ.
CARD. (1998). Operations manual. San Pablo City: CARD Research Unit.
Getubig, I., Remenyi, J., & Quiñones, B. (Eds.). (1997). Creating the vision:
Microfinancing the poor in Asia-Pacific. Kuala Lumpur: Asian and Pacific
Development Centre
Quiñones, B., Seibel, H. D., & Llanto, G.M. (1999, forthcoming). Social capital
in microfinance: The case of the Philippines. Kuala Lumpur: Asian and
Pacific Development Centre.
Rojahn, D., & Osner, K. (1998). Report on the self evaluation workshop of the replications of the Grameen Bank methodology in Asia. Eschborn: GTZ.
SEEP Network Financial Services Working Group. (1995). Financial ratio analysis of microfinance institutions. New York: Pact Publications.
Seibel, H. D. (1998, September). Grameen replicators—do they reach the poor, and
are they sustainable? Paper presented at the Second Seminar on
Development Finance, Frankfurt, Germany: IPC. Also available online at:
http://www.uni-koeln.de/ew-fak/aef/working.htm.
Seibel, H. D., Llanto, G. M, Garcia, E., & Callanta, E. (1998, January).
Microfinance in the Philippines. (Economics and Sociology Occasional
Papers No. 2367). Columbus, Ohio: Rural Finance Program, Dept. of
Agricultural Economics, The Ohio State University.
Torres, D. M. (1998). Managing delinquency undportfolio quality. San Pablo City,
Philippines: CARD.

130

Volume 1 Number 1

